Welcome to Economics!.Chapter 2. Choice in a World of Scarcity.Chapter 3. Demand and Supply.Chapter 4. Labor and Financial Markets.Chapter 5.
Elasticity.Chapter 6. Consumer Choices.Chapter 7. Cost and Industry Structure.Chapter 8. Perfect Competition.Chapter 9. Monopoly.Chapter 10.
Command and Control Software is designed to provide security and surveillance applications in a highly customizable and user-friendly environment.
Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly.Chapter 11. Monopoly and Antitrust Policy.Chapter 12. Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities.Chapter 13. Positive Externalities and Public Goods.Chapter 14. Poverty and Economic Inequality.Chapter 15. Issues in Labor Markets: Unions, Discrimination, Immigration.Chapter 16. Information, Risk, and Insurance.Chapter 17.
Financial Markets.Chapter 18. Public Economy.Chapter 19.
The Macroeconomic Perspective.Chapter 20. Economic Growth.Chapter 21. Unemployment.Chapter 22.
Inflation.Chapter 23. The International Trade and Capital Flows.Chapter 24. The Aggregate Demand/Aggregate Supply Model.Chapter 25. The Keynesian Perspective.Chapter 26. The Neoclassical Perspective.Chapter 27. Money and Banking.Chapter 28. Monetary Policy and Bank Regulation.Chapter 29.
Exchange Rates and International Capital Flows.Chapter 30. Government Budgets and Fiscal Policy.Chapter 31. The Impacts of Government Borrowing.Chapter 32. Macroeconomic Policy Around the World.Chapter 33. International Trade.Chapter 34.
Globalization and Protectionism. Explain command-and-control regulation. Evaluate the effectiveness of command-and-control regulationWhen the United States started passing comprehensive environmental laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a typical law specified how much pollution could be emitted out of a smokestack or a drainpipe and imposed penalties if that limit was exceeded. Other laws required the installation of certain equipment—for example, on automobile tailpipes or on smokestacks—to reduce pollution.
These types of laws, which specify allowable quantities of pollution and which also may detail which pollution-control technologies must be used, fall under the category of command-and-control regulation. In effect, command-and-control regulation requires that firms increase their costs by installing anti-pollution equipment; firms are thus required to take the social costs of pollution into account.Command-and-control regulation has been highly successful in protecting and cleaning up the U.S.
In 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created to oversee all environmental laws. In the same year, the Clean Air Act was enacted to address air pollution. Just two years later, in 1972, Congress passed and the president signed the far-reaching Clean Water Act. These command-and-control environmental laws, and their amendments and updates, have been largely responsible for America’s cleaner air and water in recent decades. However, economists have pointed out three difficulties with command-and-control environmental regulation.First, command-and-control regulation offers no incentive to improve the quality of the environment beyond the standard set by a particular law. Once the command-and-control regulation has been satisfied, polluters have zero incentive to do better.Second, command-and-control regulation is inflexible. It usually requires the same standard for all polluters, and often the same pollution-control technology as well.
This means that command-and-control regulation draws no distinctions between firms that would find it easy and inexpensive to meet the pollution standard—or to reduce pollution even further—and firms that might find it difficult and costly to meet the standard. Firms have no reason to rethink their production methods in fundamental ways that might reduce pollution even more and at lower cost.Third, command-and-control regulations are written by legislators and the EPA, and so they are subject to compromises in the political process.
Existing firms often argue (and lobby) that stricter environmental standards should not apply to them, only to new firms that wish to start production. Consequently, real-world environmental laws are full of fine print, loopholes, and exceptions.Although critics accept the goal of reducing pollution, they question whether command-and-control regulation is the best way to design policy tools for accomplishing that goal.
A different approach is the use of market-oriented tools, which are discussed in the next section. Key Concepts and SummaryCommand-and-control regulation sets specific limits for pollution emissions and/or specific pollution-control technologies that must be used.
Although such regulations have helped to protect the environment, they have three shortcomings: they provide no incentive for going beyond the limits they set; they offer limited flexibility on where and how to reduce pollution; and they often have politically-motivated loopholes. Critical Thinking Questions. Would environmentalists favor command-and-control policies as a way to reduce pollution? Why or why not?. Consider two ways of protecting elephants from poachers in African countries.
In one approach, the government sets up enormous national parks that have sufficient habitat for elephants to thrive and forbids all local people to enter the parks or to injure either the elephants or their habitat in any way. In a second approach, the government sets up national parks and designates 10 villages around the edges of the park as official tourist centers that become places where tourists can stay and bases for guided tours inside the national park. Consider the different incentives of local villagers—who often are very poor—in each of these plans. Which plan seems more likely to help the elephant population?
“War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors onwhich action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesseruncertainty. . . . The commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannotsee; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which,because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.”
To put effective command and control into practice, we must first understandits fundamental nature—its purpose, characteristics, environment, and basicfunctioning. This understanding will become the basis for developing atheory and a practical philosophy of command and control.
HOW IMPORTANT IS COMMAND AND CONTROL?
No single activity in war is more important than command and control.Command and control by itself will not drive home a single attack againstan enemy force. It will not destroy a single enemy target. It will noteffect a single emergency resupply. Yet none of these essential warfightingactivities, or any others, would be possible without effective commandand control. Without command and control, campaigns, battles, and organizedengagements are impossible, military units degenerate into mobs, and thesubordination of military force to policy is replaced by random violence.In short, command and control is essential to all military operations andactivities.
With command and control, the countless activities a military forcemust perform gain purpose and direction. Done well, command and controladds to our strength. Done poorly, it invites disaster, even against aweaker enemy. Command and control helps commanders make the most of whatthey have—people, information, material, and, often most important of all,time.
In the broadest sense, command and control applies far beyond militaryforces and military operations. Any system comprising multiple, interactingelements, from societies to sports teams to any living organism, needssome form of command and control. Simply put, command and control in someform or another is essential to survival and success in any competitiveor cooperative enterprise. Command and control is a fundamental requirementfor life and growth, survival, and success for any system.
WHAT IS COMMAND AND CONTROL?
We often think of command and control as a distinct and specializedfunction—like logistics, intelligence, electronic warfare, or administration—withits own peculiar methods, considerations, and vocabulary, and occurringindependently of other functions. But in fact, command and control encompassesall military functions and operations, giving them meaning and harmonizingthem into a meaningful whole. None of the above functions, or any others,would be purposeful without command and control. Command and control isnot the business of specialists—unless we consider the commander a specialist—becausecommand and control is fundamentally the business of the commander.1
Command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes whatneeds to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Sometimesthis recognition takes the form of a conscious command decision—as in decidingon a concept of operations. Sometimes it takes the form of a preconditionedreaction—as in immediate-action drills, practiced in advance so that wecan execute them reflexively in a moment of crisis. Sometimes it takesthe form of a rules-based procedure—as in the guiding of an aircraft onfinal approach. Some types of command and control must occur so quicklyand precisely that they can be accomplished only by computers—such as thecommand and control of a guided missile in flight. Other forms may requiresuch a degree of judgment and intuition that they can be performed onlyby skilled, experienced people—as in devising tactics, operations, andstrategies.
Sometimes command and control occurs concurrently with the action beingundertaken—in the form of real-time guidance or direction in response toa changing situation. Sometimes it occurs beforehand and even after. Planning,whether rapid/time-sensitive or deliberate, which determines aims and objectives,develops concepts of operations, allocates resources, and provides fornecessary coordination, is an important element of command and control.Furthermore, planning increases knowledge and elevates situational awareness.Effective training and education, which make it more likely that subordinateswill take the proper action in combat, establish command and control beforethe fact. The immediate-action drill mentioned earlier, practiced beforehand,provides command and control. A commander’s intent, expressed clearly beforethe evolution begins, is an essential part of command and control. Likewise,analysis after the fact, which ascertains the results and lessons of theaction and so informs future actions, contributes to command and control.
Some forms of command and control are primarily procedural or technicalin nature—such as the control of air traffic and air space, the coordinationof supporting arms, or the fire control of a weapons system. Others dealwith the overall conduct of military actions, whether on a large or smallscale, and involve formulating concepts, deploying forces, allocating resources,supervising, and so on. This last form of command and control, the overallconduct of military actions, is our primary concern in this manual. Unlessotherwise specified, it is to this form that we refer.
Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we can measure the effectivenessof command and control only in relation to the enemy. As a practical matter,therefore, effective command and control involves protecting our own commandand control activities against enemy interference and actively monitoring,manipulating, and disrupting the enemy’s command and control activities.
WHAT IS THE BASIS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL?
The basis for all command and control is the authority vested in a commanderover subordinates. Authority derives from two sources. Official authorityis a function of rank and position and is bestowed by organization andby law. Personal authority is a function of personal influence and derivesfrom factors such as experience, reputation, skill, character, and personalexample. It is bestowed by the other members of the organization. Officialauthority provides the power to act but is rarely enough; most effectivecommanders also possess a high degree of personal authority. Responsibility,or accountability for results, is a natural corollary of authority. Wherethere is authority, there must be responsibility in like measure. Conversely,where individuals have responsibility for achieving results, they mustalso have the authority to initiate the necessary actions.2
WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “COMMAND” AND “CONTROL”?
The traditional view of command and control sees “com- mand” and “control”as operating in the same direction: from the top of the organization towardthe bottom.3 (See figure 1.)Commanders impose control on those under their command; commanders are“in control” of their subordinates, and subordinates are “under the control”of their commanders.
We suggest a different and more dynamic view of command and controlwhich sees command as the exercise of authority and control as feedbackabout the effects of the action taken. (See figure 1.) The commander commandsby deciding what needs to be done and by directing or influencing the conductof others. Control takes the form of feedback—the continuous flow of informationabout the unfolding situation returning to the commander—which allows thecommander to adjust and modify command action as needed. Feedback indicatesthe difference between the goals and the situation as it exists. Feedbackmay come from any direction and in any form—intelligence about how theenemy is reacting, information about the status of subordinate or adjacentunits, or revised guidance from above based on developments. Feedback isthe mechanism that allows commanders to adapt to changing circumstances—toexploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developing problems, modifyschemes, or redirect efforts. In this way, feedback “controls” subsequentcommand action. In such a command and control system, control is not strictlysomething that seniors impose on subordinates; rather, the entire systemcomes “under control” based on feedback about the changing situation.4
Command and control is thus an interactive process involving all theparts of the system and working in all directions. The result is a mutuallysupporting system of give and take in which complementary commanding andcontrolling forces interact to ensure that the force as a whole can adaptcontinuously to changing requirements.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE “IN CONTROL”?
The typical understanding of effective command and control is that someone“in command” should also be “in control.” Typically, we think of a strong,coercive type of command and control—a sort of pushbutton control—by whichthose “in control” dictate the actions of others and those “under control”respond promptly and precisely, as a chess player controls the movementsof the chess pieces. But given the nature of war, can commanders controltheir forces with anything even resembling the omnipotence of the chessplayer? We might say that a gunner is in control of a weapon system orthat a pilot is in control of an aircraft. But is a flight leader reallydirectly in control of how the other pilots fly their aircraft? Is a seniorcommander really in control of the squads of Marines actually engagingthe enemy, especially on a modern battlefield on which units and individualswill often be widely dispersed, even to the point of isolation?
We are also fond of saying that commanders should be “in control” ofthe situation or that the situation is “under control.” The worst thingthat can happen to a commander is to “lose” control of the situation. Butare the terrain and weather under the commander’s control? Are commanderseven remotely in control of what the enemy does? Good commanders may sometimesanticipate the enemy’s actions and may even influence the enemy’s actionsby seizing the initiative and forcing the enemy to react to them. But itis a delusion to believe that we can truly be in control of the enemy orthe situation.5
The truth is that, given the nature of war, it is a delusion to thinkthat we can be in control with any sort of certitude or precision. Andthe further removed commanders are from the Marines actually engaging theenemy, the less direct control they have over their actions. We must keepin mind that war is at base a human endeavor. In war, unlike in chess,“pieces” consist of human beings, all reacting to the situation as it pertainsto each one separately, each trying to survive, each prone to making mistakes,and each subject to the vagaries of human nature. We could not get peopleto act like mindless robots, even if we wanted to.
Given the nature of war, the remarkable thing is not that commanderscannot be thoroughly in control but rather that they can achieve much influenceat all. We should accept that the proper object of command and controlis not to be thoroughly and precisely in control. The turbulence of modernwar suggests a need for a looser form of influence—some- thing that ismore akin to the willing cooperation of a basketball team than to the omnipotentdirection of the chess player—that provides the necessary guidance in anuncertain, disorderly, time-competitive environment without stifling theinitiative of subordinates.
COMPLEXITY IN COMMAND AND CONTROL
Military organizations and military evolutions are complex systems.War is an even more complex phenomenon—our complex system interacting withthe enemy’s complex system in a fiercely competitive way. A complex systemis any system composed of multiple parts, each of which must act individuallyaccording to its own circumstances and which, by so acting, changes thecircumstances affecting all the other parts. A boxer bobbing and weavingand trading punches with his opponent is a complex system. A soccer teamis a complex system, as is the other team, as is the competitive interactionbetween them. A squad-sized combat patrol, changing formation as it movesacross the terrain and reacting to the enemy situation, is a complex system.A battle between two military forces is itself a complex system.6
Each individual part of a complex system may itself be a complex system—asin the military, in which a company consists of several platoons and aplatoon comprises several squads—creating multiple levels of complexity.But even if this is not so, even if each of the parts is fairly simplein itself, the result of the interactions among the parts is highly complicated,unpredictable, and even uncontrollable behavior. Each part often affectsother parts in ways that simply cannot be anticipated, and it is from theseunpredictable interactions that complexity emerges. With a complex systemit is usually extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate individualcauses and their effects since the parts are all connected in a complexweb. The behavior of complex systems is frequently nonlinear which meansthat even extremely small influences can have decisively large effects,or vice versa. Clausewitz wrote that “success is not due simply to generalcauses. Particular factors can often be decisive—details only known tothose who were on the spot . . . while issues can be decided by chancesand incidents so minute as to figure in histories simply as anecdotes.”7 The element of chance, interactingrandomly with the various parts of the system, introduces even more complexityand unpredictability.
It is not simply the number of parts that makes a system complex: itis the way those parts interact. A machine can be complicated and consistof numerous parts, but the parts generally interact in a specific, designedway—or else the machine will not function. While some systems behave mech-anistically, complex systems most definitely do not. Complex systems tendto be open systems, interacting frequently and freely with other systemsand the external environment. Complex systems tend to behave more “organically”—thatis, more like biological organisms.8
The fundamental point is that any military action, by its very naturea complex system, will exhibit messy, unpredictable, and often chaoticbehavior that defies orderly, efficient, and precise control. Our approachto command and control must find a way to cope with this inherent complexity.While a machine operator may be in control of the machine, it is difficultto imagine any commander being in control of a complex phenomenon likewar.
This view of command and control as a complex system characterized byreciprocal action and feedback has several important features which distinguishit from the typical view of command and control and which are central toour approach. First, this view recognizes that effective command and controlmust be sensitive to changes in the situation. This view sees the militaryorganization as an open system, interacting with its surroundings (especiallythe enemy), rather than as a closed system focused on internal efficiency.An effective command and control system provides the means to adapt tochanging conditions. We can thus look at command and control as a processof continuous adaptation. We might better liken the military organizationto a predatory animal—seeking information, learning, and adapting in itsquest for survival and success—than to some “lean, green machine.” Likea living organism, a military organization is never in a state of stableequilibrium but is instead in a continuous state of flux—continuously adjustingto its sur- roundings.
Second, the action-feedback loop makes command and control a continuous,cyclic process and not a sequence of discrete actions—as we will discussin greater detail later. Third, the action-feedback loop also makes commandand control a dynamic, interactive process of cooperation. As we have discussed,command and control is not so much a matter of one part of the organization“getting control over” another as something that connects all the elementstogether in a cooperative effort. All parts of the organization contributeaction and feedback—“command” and “control”—in overall cooperation. Commandand control is thus fundamentally an activity of reciprocal influence—giveand take among all parts, from top to bottom and side to side.
Fourth, as a result, this view does not see the commander as being abovethe system, exerting command and control from the outside—like a chessplayer moving the chess pieces—but as being an integral part of this complexweb of reciprocal influence. And finally, as we have mentioned, this viewrecognizes that it is unreasonable to expect command and control to provideprecise, predictable, and mechanistic order to a complex undertaking likewar.
WHAT MAKES UP COMMAND AND CONTROL?
The words “command” and “control” can be nouns,9and used in this way the phrase command and control describes a system—anarrangement of different elements that interact to produce effective andharmonious actions. The basic elements of our command and control systemare people, information, and the command and control support structure.
The first element of command and control is people—people who gatherinformation, make decisions, take action, communicate, and cooperate withone another in the accomplishment of a common goal. People drive the commandand control system—they make things happen—and the rest of the system existsonly to serve them. The essence of war is a clash between human wills,and any concept of command and control must recognize this first. Becauseof this human element, command is inseparable from leadership. The aimof command and control is not to eliminate or lessen the role of peopleor to make people act like robots, but rather to help them perform better.Human beings—from the senior commander framing a strategic concept to alance corporal calling in a situation report—are integral components ofthe command and control system and not merely users of it.
All Marines feel the effects of fear, privation, and fatigue. Each hasunique, intangible qualities which cannot be captured by any organizationalchart, procedure, or piece of equipment. The human mind has a capacityfor judgment, intuition, and imagination far superior to the analyticalcapacity of even the most powerful computer. It is precisely this aspectof the human element that makes war in general, and command in particular,ultimately an art rather than a science. An effective command and controlsystem must account for the characteristics and limits of human natureand at the same time exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. At anylevel, the key individual in the command and control system is the commanderwho has the final responsibility for success.
The second element of command and control is information, which refersto representations of reality which we use to “inform”—to give form andcharacter to—our decisions and actions. Information is the words, letters,numbers, images, and symbols we use to represent things, events, ideas,and values. In one way or another, command and control is essentially aboutinformation: getting it, judging its value, processing it into useful form,acting on it, sharing it with others. Information is how we give structureand shape to the material world, and it thus allows us to give meaningto and to gain understanding of the events and conditions which surroundus. In a very broad sense, information is a control parameter: it allowsus to provide control or structure to our actions.10
Games like crimson steam pirates full. The value of information exists in time since information most oftendescribes fleeting conditions. Most information grows stale with time,valuable one moment but irrelevant or even misleading the next.
There are two basic uses for information. The first is to help createsituational awareness as the basis for a decision. The second is to directand coordinate actions in the execution of the decision. While distinctin concept, the two uses of information are rarely mutually exclusive inpractice. There will usually be quite a bit of overlap since the same exchangeof information often serves both purposes simultaneously. For example,coordination between adjacent units as they execute the plan can also helpshape each unit’s understanding of the situation and so inform future decisions.An order issued to subordinates describes the tasks to be accomplishedand provides necessary coordinating instructions; but the same order shouldprovide a subordinate insight into the larger situation and into how thesubordinate’s actions fit into that larger situation. Likewise, a callfor fire, the primary purpose of which is to request supporting arms froma supporting unit, also provides information about the developing situationin the form of a target location and description.
Information forms range from data—raw, unprocessed signals—to informationthat has been evaluated and integrated into meaningful knowledge and understanding.A commander’s guidance to the staff and orders to subordinates constituteinformation as do intelligence about the enemy, status reports from subordinateunits, or coordination between adjacent units. Without the informationthat provides the basis of situational awareness, no commander—no matterhow experienced or wise—can make sound decisions. Without information thatconveys understanding of the concept and intent, subordinates cannot actproperly. Without information in the form of a strike brief which providesunderstanding of the situation on the ground, a pilot cannot provide closeair support. Without information which provides understanding of an upcomingoperation and the status of supply, the logistician cannot provide adequatecombat service support.
Effective command and control is not simply a matter of generating enoughinformation. Most information is not important or even relevant. Much isunusable given the time available. More is inaccurate, and some can actuallybe misleading. Given information-gathering capabilities today, there isthe distinct danger of overwhelming commanders with more information thanthey can possibly assimilate. In other words, too much information is asbad as too little—and probably just as likely to occur. Some kinds of informationcan be counterproductive—information which misleads us, which spreads panic,or which leads to overcontrol. Information is valuable only insofar asit contributes to effective decisions and actions. The critical thing isnot the amount of information, but key elements of information, availablewhen needed and in a useful form, which improve the commander’s awarenessof the situation and ability to act.
The final element of command and control is the command and controlsupport structure11 which aidsthe people who create, disseminate, and use information. It includes theorganizations, procedures, equipment, facilities, training, education,and doctrine which support command and control. It is important to notethat although we often refer to families of hardware as “systems” themselves,the command and control system is much more than simply equipment. High-qualityequipment and advanced technology do not guarantee effective command andcontrol. Effective command and control starts with qualified people andan effective guiding philosophy. We must recognize that the componentsof the command and control support structure do not exist for their ownsake but solely to help people recognize what needs to be done and takethe appropriate action.
WHAT DOES COMMAND AND CONTROL DO?
The words “command” and “control” are also verbs,12and used that way, the phrase command and control describes a process—acollection of related activities. We draw an important distinction betweena process, a collection of related activities, and a procedure, a specificsequence of steps for accomplishing a specific task. Command and controlis a process. It may include procedures for performing certain tasks, butit is not itself a procedure and should not be approached as one.
Command and control is something we do. These activities include, butare not limited to, gathering and analyzing information, making decisions,organizing resources, planning, communicating instructions and other information,coordina-ting, monitoring results, and supervising execution.
As we seek to improve command and control, we should not become so wrappedup in feeding and perfecting the process that we lose sight of the objectof command and control in the first place. For example, we should not becomeso con- cerned with the ability to gather and analyze huge amounts of informationefficiently that we lose sight of the primary goal of helping the commandergain a true awareness of the situation as the basis for making and implementingdecisions. The ultimate object is not an efficient command and controlprocess; the ultimate objective is the effective conduct of military action.
So rather than ask what are the functions that make up command and control,we might better ask: What should effective command and control do for us?First, it should help provide insight into the nature and requirementsof the problem facing us. It should help develop intelligence about theenemy and the surroundings. As much as possible, it should help to identifyenemy capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities. It should help usunderstand our own situation—to include identifying our own vulnerabilities.In short, it should help us gain situational awareness.
Next, command and control should help us devise suitable and meaningfulgoals and adapt those goals as the situation changes. It should help usdevise appropriate actions to achieve those goals. It should help us providedirection and focus to create vigorous and harmonious action among thevarious elements of the force. It should help us provide a means of continuouslymonitoring developments as the basis for adapting. It should provide securityto deny the enemy knowledge of our true intentions. And above all, it shouldhelp generate tempo of action since we recognize that speed is a weapon.
So, what does command and control do? In short, effective command andcontrol helps generate swift, appropriate, decisive, harmonious, and secureaction.
THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL: UNCERTAINTY AND TIME
The defining problem of command and control that overwhelms all othersis the need to deal with uncertainty.13Were it not for uncertainty, command and control would be a simple matterof managing resources. In the words of Carl von Clausewitz, “War is therealm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action inwar is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitiveand discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scentout the truth.” 14
Uncertainty is what we do not know about a given sit-uation—which isusually a great deal, even in the best of circumstances. We can think ofuncertainty as doubt which blocks or threatens to block action.15Uncertainty pervades the battlefield in the form of unknowns about theenemy, about the surroundings, and even about our own forces. We may beuncertain about existing conditions—factual information— such as the locationand strength of enemy forces. But even if we are reasonably sure aboutfactual information, we will be less certain of what to infer from thosefacts. What are the enemy’s intentions, for example? And even if we makea reasonable inference from the available facts, we cannot know which ofthe countless possible eventualities will occur.
In short, uncertainty is a fundamental attribute of war. We strive toreduce uncertainty to a manageable level by gathering and using information,but we must accept that we can never eliminate it. Why is this so? First,since war is fundamentally a human enterprise, it is shaped by human natureand is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiaritieswhich characterize human behavior. Human beings, friendly as well as enemy,are unpredictable. Second, because war is a complex struggle between independenthuman wills, we can never expect to anticipate with certainty what eventswill develop. In other words, the fundamentally complex and interactivenature of war generates uncertainty. Uncertainty is not merely an existingenvironmental condition; it is a natural byproduct of war.
Command and control aims to reduce the amount of un- certainty thatcommanders must deal with—to a reasonable point—so they can make sounddecisions. Though we try to reduce uncertainty by providing information,there will always be some knowledge that we lack. We will be aware of someof the gaps in our knowledge, but we will not even be aware of other unknowns.We must understand the forces that guarantee uncertainty and resolve toact despite it on the basis of what we do know.
It is important to note that certainty is a function of knowledge andunderstanding and not merely of data. Although they are clearly related—theyare all forms of information, as we will discuss—the distinctions amongthem are important. Data serve as the raw material for knowledge and understanding.Knowledge and understanding result when human beings add meaning to data.Properly provided and processed, data can lead to knowledge and understanding,but the terms are not synonymous. Paradoxically, not all data lead to knowledgeand understanding; some may even hamper the gaining of knowledge and understanding.The essential lesson from this distinction is that decreased uncertaintyis not simply a matter of increased information flow. More important arethe quality of the information and the abilities of the person using it—andthe willingness and ability to make decisions in the face of uncertainty.
The second main element that affects command and control, second onlyto uncertainty in order of importance, is the factor of time. Theoretically,we can always reduce uncertainty by gaining more knowledge of the situation(accepting that there is some information we can never gain). The basicdilemma is that to gain and process information takes time. This createsthree related problems. First, the knowledge we gain in war is perishable:as we take the time to gain new information, information already gainedis becoming obsolete. Second, since war is a contest between opposing wills,time itself is a precious commodity used by both sides. While we striveto get information about a particular situation, the enemy may alreadybe acting—and changing the situation in the process. (Of course, the enemyfaces the same problem in relation to us.) And third, the rapid tempo ofmodern operations limits the amount of information that can be gathered,processed, and assimilated in time to be of use. Command and control thusbecomes a tense race against time. So the second absolute requirement inany command and control system is to be fast—at least faster than the enemy.
The resulting tension between coping with uncertainty and racing againsttime presents the fundamental challenge of command and control. This isperhaps the single most important point to take from this chapter. It isalso important to recognize that the enemy faces the same problems—andthe object is to achieve some relative advantage. Although there is noeasy answer to this problem, the successful commander must find a solution,as we will discuss.
COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Many of the factors that influence command and control are timeless—thenature of war and of human beings and the twin problems of uncertaintyand time, for example. On the other hand, numerous factors are peculiarto a particular age or at least dependent on the characteristics of thatage. As war has evolved through the ages, so has command and control. Ingeneral, as war has become increasingly complicated, so have the meansof command and control. What can we conclude about the environment in whichcommand and control must function today and in the foreseeable future?
The prevailing characteristics of the information age are variety andrapid, ongoing change. An unstable and changeable world situation can leadto countless varieties of conflict requiring peacekeeping operations onthe one extreme to general war on the other. Since we cannot predict whenand where the next crisis will arise or what form it will take, our commandand control must function effectively in any envi- ronment.
Technological improvements in mobility, range, lethality, and information-gatheringcontinue to compress time and space, forcing higher operating tempos andcreating a greater demand for information. Military forces may move morequickly over greater distances than ever before, engaging the enemy atgreater ranges than ever before. The consequence of this is fluid, rapidlychanging military situations. The more quickly the situation changes, thegreater the need for continuously updated information and the greater thestrain on command and control. Future conflict will require military forcesable to adapt quickly to a variety of unexpected circumstances.
The increasing lethality and range of weapons over time has compelledmilitary forces to disperse in order to survive, similarly stretching thelimits of command and control. Military forces are bigger and more complexthan ever before, consisting of a greater number and variety of specializedorganizations and weapons. As a result, modern military forces requireever greater amounts of information in order to operate and sustain themselves,even in a peacetime routine.
In the current age, technology is increasingly important to commandand control. Advances in technology provide capabilities never before dreamedof. But technology is not without its dangers, namely the overrelianceon equipment on the one hand and the failure to fully exploit the latestcapabilities on the other. It is tempting, but a mistake, to believe thattechnology will solve all the problems of command and control. Many hopesof a decisive technological leap forward have been dashed by unexpectedcomplications and side effects or by the inevitable rise of effective countermeasures.Moreover, used unwisely, technology can be part of the problem, contributingto information overload and feeding the dangerous illusion that certaintyand precision in war are not only desirable, but attainable.
In this complicated age, command and control is espe- cially vulnerableand not just to the physical destruction of facilities and personnel byenemy attack. As the command and control system becomes increasingly complex,it likewise becomes increasingly vulnerable to disruption, monitoring,and penetration by the enemy as well as to the negative side effects ofits own complicated functioning. Its own complexity can make command andcontrol vulnerable to disruption by information overload, the overrelianceon technology, misinformation, communications interference, lack of humanunderstanding, lack of technical proficiency or training, mechanical breakdown,and systemic failure.
CONCLUSION
Although command and control systems have evolved continuously throughouthistory, the fundamental nature of command in war is timeless. Noteworthyimprovements in technology, organization, and procedures have not easedthe demands of command and control at all and probably never will. Whilethese improvements have increased the span of command and control, theyhave barely kept pace with the increasing dispersion of forces and complexityof war itself. Whatever the age or technology, the key to effective commandand control will come down to dealing with the fundamental problems ofuncertainty and time. Whatever the age or technology, effective commandand control will come down to people using information to decide and actwisely. And whatever the age or technology, the ultimate measure of commandand control effectiveness will always be the same: Can it help us act fasterand more effectively than the enemy?